Justice TODD.
In this appeal, our Court granted review to determine whether Appellee, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA"), may be considered an "arm" of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which, under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, would confer upon SEPTA sovereign immunity from lawsuits brought by injured employees
Appellants in this matter, Marjorie Goldman, Edmund Wiza, Michael Maguire, and Errol Davis, individually commenced lawsuits against SEPTA in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia asserting that they sustained injuries during the course and scope of their employment with the Regional Rail Division of SEPTA.
Employees of SEPTA's Regional Rail Division have been covered by FELA since 1983 when the Regional Rail Division assumed responsibility for providing passenger rail services formerly provided by Conrail.
In response to each of the suits brought by Appellants Goldman, Wiza, and Maguire in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, SEPTA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that it was a state agency immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The cases were consolidated for argument
Subsequently, SEPTA filed a motion for summary judgment in these three cases, again averring that it was a state agency, and, also, asserting that it was an instrumentality of the Commonwealth entitled to sovereign immunity under Article 1, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2310. SEPTA additionally contended that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution conferred immunity upon it under certain relevant interpretive decisions of the United States Supreme Court, discussed at greater length infra, as it viewed itself "[a]s the State's arm/alter ego for mass transit." SEPTA Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/31/08, at ¶ 62.
In response, Appellants Goldman, Wiza, and Maguire filed a joint motion for partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss or strike the affirmative immunity defenses SEPTA raised. Appellants averred that SEPTA was not a part of the Commonwealth government, and, thus, was not entitled to assert the sovereign immunity of a state against a suit by a private individual brought under federal law.
At the request of the parties, Judge Alejandro conducted extensive hearings over a three-day period in order to permit the parties to develop an evidentiary record pertaining to issues raised in the motions, such as the manner in which SEPTA was legally structured, conducted its operations, and the means by which those operations were funded Judge Alejandro subsequently denied SEPTA's motion for summary judgment, and granted Appellants' joint motion for partial summary judgment. SEPTA sought to have this order certified for purposes of immediate appeal, and Judge Alejandro granted the motion.
With respect to Appellant Davis' FELA action, also filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, SEPTA filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that SEPTA, as an agency of the Commonwealth, had sovereign immunity under the Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8501-8527, and, thus, may be sued only if the suit falls within one of the enumerated exceptions set forth in the Act, see id. § 8522. SEPTA contended that the Commonwealth had not waived SEPTA's sovereign immunity, and that since sovereign immunity was recognized as a state's constitutional right, Congress did not have the power, absent such an express waiver, to subject SEPTA to suit under FELA. The matter was assigned to Senior Judge Sheldon Jelin, who denied the motion and scheduled the case for trial.
Prior to trial, SEPTA renewed its motion for summary judgment based on its claim of sovereign immunity. Judge Jelin did not rule on this new motion, and Davis's case proceeded to jury trial, after which the jury returned a verdict in Davis's favor in the amount of $740,000. SEPTA filed post-trial motions which Judge Jelin granted in part, and he awarded SEPTA a new trial. Judge Jelin dismissed SEPTA's renewed motion for summary judgment as moot. Davis appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which reversed Judge Jelin's order granting a new trial and directed Judge Jelin to address SEPTA's motion for summary judgment on the issue of sovereign immunity. Upon reconsideration, Judge Jelin granted the motion and entered summary judgment in favor of SEPTA. Davis appealed that determination.
Inasmuch as SEPTA's appeal in the Goldman, Wiza, and Maguire matters and Davis' appeal presented the identical question of whether the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity extended to shield SEPTA from FELA claims brought in
Judge Alejandro noted that, because Congress enacted FELA pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, under Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (holding that a state's immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment may not be overridden by Congress pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers), FELA itself could not and did not abrogate the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity; however, she found that, in a later case, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (holding states have sovereign immunity in their own courts from suits brought by private individuals under federal law), the high Court specified that only states themselves and entities which could be considered arms of the state were entitled to claim such immunity. Thus, she focused on the question of whether SEPTA could be considered an arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
In this regard, Judge Alejandro discussed various decisions from our Court and the Commonwealth Court, which reached differing conclusions on the question of SEPTA's status as an agency of the Commonwealth in various cases brought under Pennsylvania law. Judge Alejandro rejected the idea that decisions from our Court recognizing SEPTA's immunity from suit under state law were controlling as to whether SEPTA was subject to the application of FELA, which is a federal statute, since she viewed the applicability of the defense of sovereign immunity to this federal cause of action as governed by federal law.
Judge Alejandro noted that the Third Circuit devised its own multifactor test, which it uses to determine if an entity constitutes an arm of the state such that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. This test examines three principal factors to which it accords equal weight: (1) whether the payment of a judgment against the entity would come from the state, (2) the entity's status under state law, and (3) the entity's degree of autonomy. Opinion of Judge Alejandro, 12/24/08, at 17 (quoting Fitchik v. New Jersey Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir.1989)(determining that "New Jersey Transit," a public corporation which operated commuter passenger rail service, was not the "alter ego" of the state of New Jersey entitling it to Eleventh Amendment immunity) ("the Fitchik test")).
Judge Alejandro found that the Third Circuit twice ruled, after applying the Fitchik test, that SEPTA was not a Commonwealth agency, but, rather, was a political subdivision not entitled to raise the defense of sovereign immunity. See Alejandro Opinion at 17-18 (citing and discussing Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807 (3d. Cir.1991) (a civil rights action brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983) and Cooper v. SEPTA, 548 F.3d 296 (3d. Cir.2008) (a suit brought in federal court under the Fair Labor Standards Act)). Judge Alejandro noted that, in both cases, the Third Circuit concluded SEPTA could not meet the first prong of the Fitchik test, since judgments against SEPTA would not be paid from the Pennsylvania treasury; the second prong weighed only slightly in favor of treating it as an arm of the Commonwealth because SEPTA possessed characteristics of both state and municipal governments; and, finally, SEPTA could not meet the third prong of the test since it enjoyed a large degree of
In his Rule 1925(a) opinion reaching the opposite conclusion, Judge Jelin considered SEPTA's assertion of sovereign immunity to be based on the Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act and, therefore, not an assertion of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Even so, with respect to the Eleventh Amendment question, Judge Jelin, like Judge Alejandro, agreed that the United States Supreme Court had rejected the principle that a federal law by its own terms could override the sovereign immunity of a state, and, in a later case, College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999), also repudiated the doctrine of "constructive waiver," under which a state's mere engagement in an activity after adoption of a federal statute regulating such activity was regarded as the state's implicit waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thus, Judge Jelin concluded there was no evidence of record to suggest that SEPTA expressly waived its sovereign immunity with respect to suits under FELA, and he regarded the Commonwealth Court's prior opinion remanding the case to have already determined that SEPTA was a "Commonwealth Party" entitled to sovereign immunity under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521. Additionally Judge Jelin found that Davis had presented no evidence to show that his cause of action fell within any of the exceptions allowing suit against a Commonwealth party provided by 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b). For both reasons, Judge Jelin found dismissal of Davis's suit to have been proper.
The Commonwealth Court, in a published en banc opinion authored by Judge Johnny Butler, affirmed Judge Jelin's entry of summary judgment for SEPTA in the Davis case, and reversed Judge Alejandro's denial of SEPTA's motion for summary judgment in the Goldman, Wiza, and Maguire cases. Davis v. SEPTA, 980 A.2d 709 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009). The Commonwealth Court observed that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994), as a general matter, agencies of a state do not enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, "unless there is good reason to believe that the State structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the State itself." Davis, 980 A.2d at 712 (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 43-44, 115 S.Ct. 394, in turn quoting Lake Country Estates Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To answer this question, the court first looked at SEPTA's organic statute, the aforementioned MTAA, and concluded it "explicitly establishes SEPTA as a Commonwealth party which enjoys the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity." Davis, 980 A.2d at 712. The court cited 74 Pa. C.S.A. § 1711(a), which states that SEPTA "shall exercise the public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency and instrumentality thereof ... for the purpose of ... operating ... and otherwise functioning
The court also cited the following factors in support of a finding that SEPTA was structured to enjoy the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity: (1) the critical role that SEPTA plays in providing transportation to residents in the proximate geographic area of the Commonwealth's largest city; (2) SEPTA's right to exercise the power of eminent domain, which the court viewed as indicative of a government function; and (3) the fact that, in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Commonwealth provided over 50% of SEPTA's operating and capital budgets. The court additionally noted the Commonwealth Courts' own past decisions which recognized SEPTA as a Commonwealth party entitled to sovereign immunity under Section 8521 of the Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8521,
Then Judge, now President Judge Dante Pellegrini dissented. Judge Pellegrini pointed out that, in Hess and in Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997), the high Court established that an important consideration in determining immunity is whether a state would be legally liable for any judgment entered against a lesser entity which it had created. Also, Judge Pellegrini noted that, in Federal Maritime Com'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002), the high Court suggested that the Eleventh Amendment's central purpose was to "`accord the states the respect owed to them as joint sovereigns.'" Davis, 980 A.2d at 717 (quoting Federal Maritime, 535 U.S. at 743, 122 S.Ct. 1864).
Because of concurrent jurisdiction over FELA actions between state courts and federal courts, Judge Pellegrini considered it "particularly appropriate to examine how the Third Circuit confers Eleventh Amendment immunity on SEPTA," reasoning that "[i]f we are at odds with the Third Circuit, the net result will be that plaintiffs will bring their actions in federal court." Davis, 980 A.2d at 717. He noted that the Third Circuit in both Bolden and Cooper applied its three-factor Fitchik "arm of the state" test and determined that SEPTA is not an arm of the Commonwealth. He pointed out that the Third Circuit regarded the factor on which the
We granted Appellants' petition for allowance of appeal to consider the following questions, as stated by Appellants:
Goldman v. SEPTA, 608 Pa. 138, 10 A.3d 898 (2010) (order).
We begin with a review of the arguments advanced by the parties. Appellants observe that our Court has always recognized that authorities and agencies are distinct legal entities and, thus, cannot automatically be considered extensions of the Commonwealth. Appellants' Brief at 14 (citing In re Acquisition of Water System in White Oak Borough, 372 Pa. 424, 427, 93 A.2d 437, 438 (1953) ("Authorities... have no original or inherent or fundamental powers of sovereignty or of legislation; they have only the power and authority granted them by enabling statutory legislation."); Tork-Hiis v. Commonwealth, 558 Pa. 170, 177, 735 A.2d 1256, 1259 (1999) ("The commonwealth and its agencies are distinct legal entities.")). Appellants contend that the United States Supreme Court established that the question of whether a particular entity may be considered an arm of the state entitled to immunity from suits in their own courts is a question of federal law, and rejected the notion that this determination can rely solely on a state's designation.
Appellants note that Bolden established that the Commonwealth's designation of SEPTA as an instrumentality and agency of the Commonwealth was not, by itself, dispositive of the question of whether SEPTA was an arm of the Commonwealth since it would allow a state legislature to freely exempt all manner of lesser government entities from federal suit. Further, Appellants assert that following this analysis would be contrary to the principle that the will of the people as expressed through Congressional legislative enactments may not be thwarted by state legislation alone, since that would serve to remove a state's populace from the protections provided to them by Congress.
Appellants argue that, in undertaking the Lake Country inquiry to determine whether the state structured an agency to enjoy its Eleventh Amendment immunity, relevant factors in addition to the characterization of the entity in its enabling legislation which created the entity should be examined, such as: how the entity operates; who appoints its governing Board; whether the state can veto the Board action; where the Board members reside; whether the Board's actions are local or statewide in scope; whether state law decisions affect the Board's operation; and whether the state is legally obligated to either fund the entity or pay the debts of the entity. Appellants proffer that all of these factors are incorporated into the Third Circuit's three-part Fitchik test which it applied in Bolden and Cooper to hold that SEPTA is not an arm of the state. Appellants also assail the decision of the Commonwealth Court as fundamentally flawed since it did not examine all relevant factors under Lake Country and Hess, but, rather, focused exclusively on SEPTA's designation in its enabling statute as a Commonwealth instrumentality.
Appellants assert that the following additional factors support the conclusion that SEPTA is not an arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
See Appellants' Brief at 39-42.
Finally, Appellants contend that the amount of state subsidies SEPTA receives is less than that computed by the Commonwealth Court. They argue that from 2004 through 2007, 64 percent of SEPTA's budget came from sources other than the Commonwealth. Appellants also point out that the Act 44 funding levels for 2008, 2009, and 2010, cited by the Commonwealth Court, were guaranteed for only those three years, and funding beyond that time period was contingent upon the federal government approving Pennsylvania's request to toll I-80, which was denied. Thus, since anticipated funding from that source will not materialize due to the denial of Pennsylvania's tolling application, the total state subsidy to SEPTA will be diminished correspondingly. Consequently, Appellants maintain that the Commonwealth Court's assumption that the amount of state subsidy would indefinitely remain at those levels, thereby ensuring a greater degree of control by the Commonwealth, was, in hindsight, flawed. In sum, Appellants argue that the Commonwealth Court erred by improperly ignoring all of these factors which, in their view, lead to the conclusion that SEPTA cannot be classified as an arm of the Commonwealth.
SEPTA responds by averring that, beginning with Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (holding that a local school board was not entitled to sovereign immunity), and continuing through Lake Country,
SEPTA points out that the high Court also emphasized that federalism requires that decisions of a state's highest court on the question of an entity's status under state law should be given deference as representing the sovereign will of that state. In this regard, SEPTA points out that our Court, in three principal cases, found it was the intent of the General Assembly, as reflected in the MTAA, to have SEPTA treated as a Commonwealth agency and, thus, to share the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity. Appellant's Brief at 14-15 (discussing Feingold v. SEPTA, 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d 1270 (1986), Tulewicz v. SEPTA, 529 Pa. 588, 606 A.2d 427 (1992), and SEPTA v. Board of Revision of Taxes, 574 Pa. 707, 833 A.2d 710 (2003)). SEPTA asserts these cases establish and represent the will of our Commonwealth as it pertains to a matter integral to its sovereignty — namely, the basic manner in which its government is to be structured.
SEPTA further asserts that according it sovereign immunity is consistent with the recognition in Hess that, both legally and practically, a state treasury should not be depleted by judgments against it; according to SEPTA, this was one of the twin purposes served by the Eleventh Amendment acknowledged by the high Court in that decision. SEPTA argues that this concern is implicated presently since it is so heavily dependent on state subsidies, which it estimates to be in excess of $750,000,000. SEPTA contends that "exposing SEPTA to a multitude of FELA claims has an impact on the Commonwealth's treasury and injures the Commonwealth itself." SEPTA Brief at 21. In SEPTA's view, exposing it to FELA liability "undermines the ability of the Commonwealth to govern its own affairs and thereby strikes at the core of sovereignty." Id. at 22.
SEPTA additionally avers that it is not autonomous, noting: the MTAA specifies procedures it must follow to terminate transportation routes, and requires it to hold public hearings before changing routes or altering fares; the SEPTA Board was created by the MTAA which specifies the manner in which the Board's membership is to be filled, how employees are to be hired, their compensation, and the procedure which must be followed to discipline them; and the MTAA spells out the strict procurement procedures which SEPTA must follow to purchase equipment such as railway vehicles, and contains other controls on its discretion such as restricting advertising to only the interior of vehicles.
Lastly, SEPTA highlights its newfound operational relationship with the Commonwealth after the passage of Act 44 since it must now, as a condition of receiving that funding, submit an operating budget indicating how anticipated income in the budget will be allocated between operating revenues and state subsidies, and that it and PennDot must enter into a financial assistance agreement which specifies how state subsidy money is to be spent. Further, Act 44 provides that spending of money pursuant to the agreement is subject to performance audits by PennDot which issues recommendations for specific administrative actions by SEPTA. SEPTA discounts the lack of state control of the SEPTA Board as a determinative factor — reasoning that the state holds effective control of its financial survival through
SEPTA urges us not to follow the Third Circuit's approach in Bolden or Cooper — asserting that we are only bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court on issues of federal law. SEPTA argues the Third Circuit's approach in Bolden and Cooper is sui generis as compared to that of other circuit courts of appeals in that it has accorded equal weight to all three factors of its test, in contrast to what SEPTA perceives as the directives of the United States Supreme Court to accord primacy to the first two prongs of its test — i.e., the degree of impact on the state treasury and the entity's status under state law.
Amicus, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, has filed a brief expressing its position that, while this Court is not bound by the decisions of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on the question of SEPTA's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, we should, nevertheless, apply its three-factor Fitchik test, which it views as both reflective of the concerns undergirding the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on this issue, and, also, similar in nature to the test utilized by other federal courts of appeal. The Commonwealth asserts that application of that test would lead to the conclusion that SEPTA is an arm of the Commonwealth.
As indicated by the unified manner in which they have framed their argument in their brief, Appellants' two issues may be distilled to one central question — whether SEPTA may be considered an arm of the Commonwealth, such that it is entitled to claim sovereign immunity from FELA suits brought against it in Pennsylvania courts under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The text of the Eleventh Amendment provides:
U.S. Const. amend. XI. This amendment was promulgated by Congress in 1794 and became part of the Constitution when ratified by 12 states in 1795.
Indeed, in the aftermath of the states' ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, the high Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, endorsed a strict textual construction of this amendment. See e.g. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 407, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (examining the language of the amendment and embracing the conclusion that "it was intended for those cases, and for those only, in which some demand against a State is made by an individual in the Courts of the Union."); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738, 847, 857, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824) ("The eleventh amendment of the constitution has exempted a State from the suits of citizens of other States, or aliens.... [I]t, is, of necessity, limited to those suits in which a State is a party on the record.") However, over time, the Court retreated from this literal interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and began to embrace a broader view of the amendment which transcends its text.
In order to further what the high Court perceived to be the core purpose of the amendment — protection of a state's inherent sovereignty — it has repeatedly extended immunity to states from certain other types of private suits brought under federal law beyond those explicitly referenced in its text. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,
The high Court also abandoned the view that the protections of the Eleventh Amendment are applicable only in those instances in which a state is a named party. In its place, the Court embraced an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment which extended sovereign immunity to entities which are agents or instrumentalities of the state such that a suit brought against them would be, for all practical purposes, a suit against the state itself. See, e.g., Ex Parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 506, 8 S.Ct. 164, 31 L.Ed. 216 (1887) (interpreting the Eleventh Amendment "not literally ... but to accomplish the substance of its purpose"; holding that federal court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin attorneys from bringing suit against taxpayers of Virginia for delinquent taxes owed under bond coupons, since the state was the real party in interest affected by the decree); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 439, 20 S.Ct. 919, 44 L.Ed. 1140 (1900) (where judgment sought against state official in federal court would require official to pay funds out of the state treasury in satisfaction, it would have the same practical effect as a judgment against the state itself and, hence, the federal action seeking judgment was barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945) (action against Indiana treasury department and its board members in their individual capacity was barred by the Eleventh Amendment since it was deemed to be an action to recover money from the state itself, hence, rendering the state the "real, substantial party in interest ... entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit."), overruled on other grounds, Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (holding that injunctive relief directing state officials to pay retroactive monetary relief violated the Eleventh Amendment since its practical effect was to require payment of public funds from the state treasury).
More recently, the principle that a proper interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment must go beyond the text of the amendment to a consideration of its underlying purpose was amplified by the high Court in the case of Seminole Tribe, where the high Court reminded:
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). The Court explained that
This "twin purpose" theory of the Eleventh Amendment articulated in Seminole Tribe formed the foundation of the Court's subsequent decision in Alden. In Alden, the Court explained that states' sovereign immunity from suit was not "derived from, nor ... limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, ... the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of the [Constitutional] Convention or certain constitutional amendments." Alden, 527 U.S. at 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240. The Court found the doctrine of the English common law, which held that the Crown could not be sued without its consent in its own courts, since no court could have jurisdiction over the king by virtue of his superiority in power, was "universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified." Id. at 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Thus, the Court reasoned that it was not the intent of the framers, through ratification of the Constitution, to strip states of their sovereign immunity. The Court viewed both the text of the Eleventh Amendment and the historical circumstances of its passage, as an attempt by Congress to "restore the original constitutional design." Id. at 722, 119 S.Ct. 2240.
The Court also highlighted two underlying principles of federalism that it perceived as counseling against recognizing a broad Congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity: the danger to states of insolvency through a drain on their treasuries by Congressional authorization of suits against the states, and the
The Court, however, also reaffirmed two fundamental limits on sovereign immunity. The first such limit is that states may be sued with their express consent in accordance with statutory enactments, and, also — consistent with its view that it is only the sovereignty of the states themselves which the amendment protects — the Court specified that "the principle of sovereign immunity ... bars suits against States but not lesser entities." Id. at 756, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Hence, "[t]he immunity does not extend to suits prosecuted against a municipal corporation or other governmental entity which is not an arm of the state." Id. This express limitation of Eleventh Amendment protection to only states and "arms of the state" has been recently reaffirmed by the high Court. See Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham County, Ga., 547 U.S. 189, 193, 126 S.Ct. 1689, 164 L.Ed.2d 367 (2006) ("A consequence of this Court's recognition of preratification sovereignty as the source of immunity from suit is that only States and arms of the State possess immunity from suits authorized by federal law.").
In accordance with these principles of federalism, which respect the dual roles of the federal and state government in our system of constitutional governance, the high Court has specified that the issue of whether an entity is an arm of the state such that it is "`one of the United States' within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, is a question of federal law." Regents, 519 U.S. at 429 n. 5, 117 S.Ct. 900. However, the Court has concomitantly emphasized that this federal question can only be answered after considering the provisions of state law that define the entity's "character." Id. The Court's analysis in this regard has evolved over the last eight decades from one that considers only the relative importance of particular state law factors relating to an entity's structure and powers, to one that, while still considering how the entity is structured under state law, now gives primacy to consideration of the state sovereignty interests which the Court recognizes the Eleventh Amendment as protecting.
The term "arm or alter ego of the state," which SEPTA claims to be, was first used by the high Court in analyzing whether a particular entity was sufficiently independent from its creating state so as to be considered a citizen for purposes of establishing federal diversity jurisdiction. In State Highway Comm'n of Wyoming v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199, 49 S.Ct. 104, 73 L.Ed. 262 (1929), the Court examined the structure of the State Highway Commission of Wyoming and concluded it could not be considered a citizen since it was but "the arm or alter ego of the state." The Court noted that the commission was merely an entity through which the state acted to contractually obligate itself to a private party, "as it might through any officer," that it had no funds of its own, no ability to respond to a suit with damages, nor did any of its members have personal liability for the actions of the commission. Id. at 199, 49 S.Ct. 104. Thus, the Court deemed a suit against the commission to be, "in effect, against the state of Wyoming." Id.
In Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 719, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), also a federal diversity case, a California county asserted that it could not be deemed a citizen, since it was "nothing
The first case under the Eleventh Amendment in which the Court examined the structure and powers of a state-created entity established by state law — a school board — in order to determine whether it was an arm of the state entitled to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, was Mt. Healthy, supra. In that case, the high Court remarked, as a general proposition, that the resolution of the issue of whether an entity is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes "depends, at least in part, upon the nature of the entity created by state law." Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. 568. As a result, the Court focused on the statutory classification of the school board within the governmental structure of Ohio, the degree of control the state exercised over the school board, and the powers of the school board to raise revenue. The Court found that the school board was statutorily considered a political subdivision which, under Ohio law, was not deemed part of the state. While the Court acknowledged that the state provided "some guidance" through the state board of education and, also, that the school board received a "significant amount of money from the [s]tate," the Court gave greater weight to the fact that the school board had "extensive" power to issue bonds and levy taxes. Id. Consequently, the Court deemed the school board "more like a county or city than ... an arm of the State," and, thus, not entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. 568.
Two years later, in Lake Country, supra, the high Court articulated additional factors to be used to assess an entity's claim that it was an arm of the state entitled to the protections of the Eleventh Amendment. In that case, the entity at issue was a regional land use planning agency for the Lake Tahoe basin created jointly by the states of Nevada and California through an interstate compact approved by Congress. The high Court found that the agency was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. In so determining, the Court reminded that it had never construed the Eleventh Amendment to extend to entities such as counties and municipalities, merely because those entities exercised "a slice of state power."
In concluding that the agency's creating states did not intend to bestow their sovereign immunity on the agency, the Court highlighted the following six factors: (1) the agency's description in the interstate compact described it as a "separate legal entity" and "political subdivision;" (2) the majority of the agency's governing board was appointed by counties and cities, not the states; (3) funding was required by the compact to be provided by the cities and counties, not the states; (4) none of the monetary obligations incurred by the agency were binding on the creating states; (5) the core function of the agency — to regulate land use — was a function normally performed by local government; and (6) even though the agency had originally been created by the government of both states, neither state possessed any continuing ability to veto actions taken by the agency, which had the authority to make rules regarding land development practices within its jurisdiction. 440 U.S. at 401, 99 S.Ct. 1171.
Application of the Lake Country test proved difficult for courts to utilize, however, in instances when some of the six factors pointed to different conclusions. Indeed, in the most notable instance the Second and Third Circuits came to opposite determinations in applying the test to an identical entity, the Port Authority Trans Hudson Corporation ("Port Authority") — which was an authority created by interstate compact between New York and New Jersey to operate a commuter railroad between those two states.
In Hess, two injured employees sued the Port Authority under FELA in federal court in New Jersey, but the suit was dismissed by the district court on the basis of its finding that the Port Authority was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from such claims, and the dismissal was upheld by the Third Circuit. In assessing whether the Port Authority was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court
First, even though the majority of commissioners of the authority (8 of 12) were required to be local residents of the district served by the authority, this did not establish local control since the commissioners were all state appointees, the governors of each state had the power to block actions taken by the authority, and the respective legislatures of both states could enlarge the authority and add to its responsibilities. Second, while neither the compact nor the enabling legislation which created the Port Authority characterized it as a state agency, decisions of state courts treated it as such. Third, the Court stated that the nature of the functions provided by the Port Authority — i.e. owning and operating bridges, tunnels, ferries, marine terminals, airports, bus terminals, industrial parks and commuter railroads — did not aid its Eleventh Amendment analysis because such activities were conducted by both states and local municipal governments and, thus, were not the exclusive province of either type of entity. Fourth, the states which created the Port Authority had no financial responsibility for it, due to the fact it was created as a financially independent entity with private funds and, because it generated its own revenue through its operations, it received no money from its creating states. Finally, the Court found the states had "no legal liability for Port Authority debts; they are not responsible for the payment of judgments against the Port Authority." Hess, 513 U.S. at 46, 115 S.Ct. 394.
The Court then delineated the manner in which it would proceed with an Eleventh Amendment analysis under such circumstances, declaring: "[w]hen indicators of immunity point in different directions, the Eleventh Amendment's twin reasons for being remain our prime guide," i.e., to accord states the respect owed them as sovereign entities and to protect states from financial ruin. Hess, 513 U.S. at 47, 115 S.Ct. 394. The Court first considered the impact to the dignity of the states of New York and New Jersey by allowing such suits against the Port Authority in federal court, and found "no genuine threat" to either state's dignity by such suits. Id. The Court relied on its conclusion that federal courts were "not alien to a bistate entity Congress participated in creating[,] nor is it disrespectful to one State to call upon the Compact Clause entity to answer complaints in federal court." Id.
In its discussion of the second principal aim of the Eleventh Amendment — protecting a state from financial harm by adverse judgments — the Court first considered and then rejected the Port Authority's argument that it was a state agency simply because the myriad of structural factors set forth above established state control of it. The Court emphasized that state control of an entity was not dispositive of such status, since focusing on control "does not home in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury." Hess, 513 U.S. at 48, 115 S.Ct. 394. The Court found that such concerns were not implicated since the Port Authority was financially independent from the states, generated its own revenue, and paid its own debts. Critically, the Court reminded that making this determination was not to be a mere accounting exercise:
Hess, 513 U.S. at 51, 115 S.Ct. 394. The Court then noted that neither state was responsible for the Port Authority's debt, and that a judgment against the Port Authority could not be enforced against either state. As a result, the Court concluded that "[r]equiring the Port Authority to answer in federal court to injured railroad workers who assert a federal statutory right, under the FELA, to recover damages does not touch the concerns — the States' solvency and dignity — that underpin the Eleventh Amendment." 513 U.S. at 52, 115 S.Ct. 394.
Although the Court in Hess used the conjunctive phrase "legally and practically" when referring to the obligation of the state to pay the debts of the entity it had created, courts differed over whether both the legal and practical financial liability of the state for a judgment against the entity had to be demonstrated in order to show that the entity was entitled to claim sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, or whether a demonstration of either factor individually was sufficient. Thus, three years after its decision in Hess, the high Court accepted review in Regents, supra, to consider that question.
In Regents, the University of California was sued in federal court for breach of an employment contract, and the university claimed it was an arm of the state of California entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the university was not entitled to sovereign immunity since it would be indemnified for any judgment against it by the federal government, pursuant to contract, and, thus, the state would not, as a practical matter, have to pay any judgment against it. The United States Supreme Court, in resolving this question, underscored, however, that it is the legal liability of the state for an adverse judgment against the entity which is the dispositive factor for purposes of determining whether the entity is an arm of the state entitled to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity:
Regents, 519 U.S. at 431-432, 117 S.Ct. 900. So, even though a judgment against the university would have no actual impact on the treasury of California due to the federal government's indemnification, the Court found that the Eleventh Amendment, nonetheless, applied to bar the suit as the Court found that it protected the state from the
Since Regents, the high Court has not specifically altered its Eleventh Amendment arm-of-the-state test, and, indeed, has continued to look to Lake Country and Hess as guideposts for making a determination regarding an entity's arm-of-the-state status. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 456, n. 1, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (citing Lake Country and Hess in finding that St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners was not an arm of the state of Missouri, since the city was solely responsible for the liabilities of the board and the board was not under the state's direction or control). Nevertheless, in situations where the Lake Country factors do
In its 2002 decision in Federal Maritime, a majority of the high Court,
Reading these decisions of the high Court in concert with one another, we
See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-281, 97 S.Ct. 568 (describing classification of entity and conferral of powers under state statutes); Lake Country, 440 U.S. at 401, 99 S.Ct. 1171 (setting forth six relevant factors in determining whether entity was arm of creating states); Hess, 513 U.S. at 44-46, 115 S.Ct. 394 (beginning its arm-of-the-state analysis by examining six indicators of immunity set forth in Lake Country). Since the high Court has not indicated that any one of these indicators of immunity is dispositive, or is to be given special weight, we must regard them as being of equal importance.
With respect to the first of these six Lake Country/Hess indicators of immunity — how SEPTA is classified under Pennsylvania law — we look to its enabling statute, the MTAA, which provides:
74 Pa.C.S.A. § 1711(a). It further provides:
Id. § 1711(c)(3) (emphasis added). We agree with SEPTA that this language establishes that SEPTA has been statutorily classified by the legislature as an agency of the Commonwealth. See, e.g., Feingold v. SEPTA, 512 Pa. 567, 578-579, 517 A.2d 1270, 1276 (1986) (concluding that, under the former version of the MTAA, "SEPTA was intended to be considered an agency of the Commonwealth"); Tulewicz v. SEPTA, 529 Pa. 588, 595-96, 606 A.2d 427, 430 (1992) (citing Feingold, to hold SEPTA could rely on the statutory cap on recoverable damages "to the same extent as would the Commonwealth"); SEPTA v. Board of Revision of Taxes, 574 Pa. 707, 718, 833 A.2d 710, 716 (2003) (under Section 1711(a), SEPTA is considered "part of the sovereignty of the Commonwealth."). But see Blount v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 600 Pa. 277, 286 n. 12, 965 A.2d 226, 232 n. 12 (2009) (observing that SEPTA's organizational and financial structure contain indicators that it is a local agency). Accordingly, the language of SEPTA's enabling statute, and the weight of our decisions construing it, establish that the first indicator of immunity points in favor of SEPTA being considered an arm of the Commonwealth.
Concerning the second indicator of immunity — the degree of control the Commonwealth exercises over SEPTA — we find this indicator points against finding that SEPTA is an arm of the Commonwealth. Here, 10 of the 15 members of the SEPTA Board — which is its "governing and policymaking body," and which possesses, inter alia, power over SEPTA's operating and capital budgets, its organizational structure, and selection of personnel — are appointed by the local governments of the five counties that comprise its service area. See 74 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1712, 1713(a). Members of the Board appointed by those counties must be residents of those counties. Id. § 1713(a)(3). Only 5 of SEPTA's 15 Board members are appointed by the Commonwealth. 74 Pa. C.S.A. § 1713(a)-(c). The Commonwealth has no power to unilaterally remove a Board member which it did not appoint. Id. § 1714(a). Further, no provision of the MTAA confers upon either the governor or the state legislature the right to veto or otherwise unilaterally alter official actions taken by a majority of the SEPTA Board. The Commonwealth's ability to exercise its official power over SEPTA Board actions is, thus, constrained by the limited proportional representation on SEPTA's Board afforded to the executive and legislative branches of the Commonwealth. Therefore, given this limited power of appointment and concomitant lack of ability of the Commonwealth to veto or officially alter Board action, the SEPTA Board cannot be deemed subject to state direction or control.
Regarding the third indicator of immunity — whether SEPTA is empowered to independently raise revenue on its own — we find that SEPTA possesses independent ability to raise revenue which is not dependent on the approval or financial backing of the Commonwealth. SEPTA has the right to set fares for the payment of its capital or operating expenses, 74 Pa.C.S.A. § 1741(15), (16), to borrow money
With respect to the fourth indicator of immunity — the degree of funding provided by the five counties SEPTA serves relative to that provided by the Commonwealth — we find that this indicator points in favor of SEPTA as an arm of the Commonwealth. Although the parties dispute the precise level of funding the Commonwealth has historically provided SEPTA, and the amount of funding it will provide in the future pursuant to Act 44, it is not disputed that the five local counties SEPTA serves are now obligated by Act 44 to provide at least 15 percent of any matching funds which are provided from the state. 74 Pa.C.S.A. § 1513(d). Thus, under the current funding scheme established by Act 44, no matter what the annual amount of the Commonwealth's assistance to SEPTA, local governments' contributions will likely be at or near this minimum proportional level. See id. § 1513(d)(2) (requiring that, in the event that local matching funds fail to meet the 15% threshold in a given fiscal year, those contributions must increase in subsequent fiscal years until the 15% threshold is reached). Accordingly, the Commonwealth's greater level of financial assistance to SEPTA relative to that provided by local governments under Act 44 weighs in favor of a finding that SEPTA is an arm of the Commonwealth.
In relation to the fifth indicator of immunity — whether SEPTA may legally bind the Commonwealth for any debt or obligation — it is clear that it may not. Section 1741 of the MTAA provides:
74 Pa.C.S.A. § 1741(c). Thus, this indicator of immunity points against finding that SEPTA is an arm of the Commonwealth.
The final indicator of immunity concerns whether SEPTA's core function — the provision of public transportation services — traditionally has been regarded as a state or local governmental function. This inquiry does not have a clear answer since, as evidenced by Pennsylvania's statutory scheme, both state and local governments share responsibilities in providing such services. Hence, merely because SEPTA provides public transportation services or, like the Port Authority in Hess, operates a commuter rail service between states, does not definitively point towards or away from a conclusion that it is an arm of the Commonwealth.
Accordingly, as in Hess, the six immunity indicators do not all point towards the same conclusion regarding whether SEPTA may be deemed an arm of the Commonwealth, although a plurality point toward finding it is not. Hess, therefore, requires us to consider whether allowing SEPTA to be sued under FELA in Pennsylvania courts would thwart the two principal purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, discussed supra: the protection of Pennsylvania's dignity as a sovereign state and the protection of Pennsylvania's state treasury against involuntary depletion from suits brought by private persons. In so doing, however, we are mindful of the
As a result, we must first consider the question of whether FELA suits brought by private individuals against SEPTA in Pennsylvania courts offend the dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Although the high Court has never articulated a precise definition of the "dignity" interest of a state, as discussed previously, the Supreme Court's conceptualization of state dignity is inextricably linked with its recognition of a state's continuing status in our constitutional system of federalism as an independent sovereign entity which retains certain inherent rights that the federal government is required to honor. See Federal Maritime, 535 U.S. at 760, 122 S.Ct. 1864 ("The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities."); Alden, 527 U.S. at 758, 119 S.Ct. 2240 ("When Congress legislates in matters affecting the States, it may not treat these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations. Congress must accord States the esteem due to them as joint participants in a federal system."); Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) ("[T]he States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity. [The Eleventh Amendment] thus accords the States the respect owed them as members of the federation." (citation omitted)).
Consistent with this view, the high Court has suggested that the principal threat it perceives to a state's dignity as an independent sovereign arises from the danger of involuntarily requiring the state to participate in a court proceeding against it at the insistence of a private party, since this creates the prospect that a state could be subjected, against its will, to the decrees and orders of a judicial tribunal. This could, in turn, impact its ability to perform its most fundamental duties of governance with respect to its citizens. As the high Court first explained over a century ago in Ayers, and has reaffirmed in its most recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence:
Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505, 8 S.Ct. 164; Alden, 527 U.S. at 749, 119 S.Ct. 2240 ("Private suits against nonconsenting States ... present `the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.'") (quoting Ayers, 123 U.S. at 506, 8 S.Ct. 164); see also Sossamon v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1657, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011) ("Immunity from private suits has long been considered central to sovereign dignity." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
In Alden, the high Court further elaborated on the specific nature of the threat to a state's sovereign dignity it perceived as arising whenever a private suit is
Alden, 527 U.S. at 749, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (citation omitted).
When a suit against SEPTA is brought in Pennsylvania's courts under FELA, however, no such threats to the sovereign dignity of the Commonwealth are presented. In such a suit, the Commonwealth is not a named defendant, as SEPTA has been designated by the legislature of the Commonwealth as a distinct legal entity with the power to sue and be sued in its own capacity. See 74 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701 (defining an authority as a "body corporate and politic"); 74 Pa.C.S.A. § 1741 (granting an authority the power to sue and be sued). Thus, it is not any purported negligent act of the Commonwealth at issue in a FELA suit, but, rather, the alleged negligent act of SEPTA itself. Neither can the Commonwealth be joined as a defendant in any FELA action against SEPTA since the Commonwealth has specifically repudiated any legal responsibility for obligations incurred by SEPTA; hence, having explicitly disclaimed all responsibility for any financial liability incurred by SEPTA, it may not be joined in a FELA suit against SEPTA under our rules of civil procedure. See Pa.R.C.P. 1706.1, 2252(a)(1), (4) (allowing joinder by plaintiff or defendant in a civil action of only those parties which are solely liable to the plaintiff, liable to the joining party, or jointly or severally liable with the joining party on the plaintiff's cause of action). Further, the Commonwealth does not enter its appearance to defend a FELA suit on SEPTA's behalf, and it does not otherwise participate in the litigation, as the legislature has explicitly placed the responsibility on SEPTA to manage all of its own legal affairs, which responsibility includes the defense of any suits against it. See 74 Pa.C.S.A. § 1722(a) (establishing a legal division which "shall administer the legal affairs of the authority, shall prosecute and defend, settle or compromise all suits or claims for and on behalf of the authority."). In sum, then, SEPTA bears the sole and exclusive burden of any FELA litigation against it in our state courts.
Because a FELA suit against SEPTA in the courts of common pleas of this Commonwealth proceeds against SEPTA, alone, as a wholly independent entity without the involvement of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth cannot, therefore, be subject to any decree or order of court as the result of such a suit. Thus, no right or interest of the Commonwealth will be affected by the outcome of a FELA suit against SEPTA in our Commonwealth's courts, and so a FELA suit poses no danger that the Commonwealth will be involuntarily "subject to and controlled by the mandates of judicial tribunals," without its consent, "at the instance of private parties." Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505, 8 S.Ct. 164. Accordingly, we conclude that a FELA action against SEPTA in our courts does not subject the Commonwealth to any indignity. Under Federal Maritime, therefore, the answer to the preeminent inquiry
This conclusion is buttressed by what remains a secondary inquiry — the impact a FELA judgment against SEPTA would have on the Commonwealth's treasury.
As our discussion above establishes, the Commonwealth has no legal liability for a FELA judgment rendered against SEPTA. See 74 Pa.C.S.A. § 1741(c). Indeed, the Commonwealth has conceded this point in its amicus brief. Commonwealth Brief at 9. However, the Commonwealth and SEPTA focus extensively on what they allege to be the practical effects of FELA judgments on the Commonwealth treasury,
While it is clear that, through Act 44, the Commonwealth
In sum, we discern no threat to the dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania whenever a private individual commences a FELA suit in the courts of this Commonwealth, nor do we find the treasury of the Commonwealth to be threatened by a FELA suit in our courts. Accordingly, we conclude SEPTA is not an arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and thus not entitled to claim immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed, and these cases are remanded to the Commonwealth Court for remand to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Justice ORIE MELVIN did not participate in the decision of this case.
Chief Justice CASTILLE and Justices SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER and McCAFFERY join the opinion.
An additional amicus brief was filed by a number of unions who represent railroad workers. Amici urge us to retain SEPTA's current status as an entity which is not immune from suit under FELA in Pennsylvania courts, since they maintain this would be consistent with the historical purpose of FELA, which is to afford injured railway workers a tort remedy which they could avail themselves of in state court.
As recognized by the parties, other circuits, post Hess and Regents, also continue to utilize their own varying multi-factor tests. See e.g. S.J. v. Hamilton County Ohio, 374 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.2004) (applying four-factor test); Beentjes v. Placer County, 397 F.3d 775 (9th Cir.2005) (applying five-factor test); Black v. North Panola School District, 461 F.3d 584 (5th Cir.2006) (applying six-factor test).